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“All islands, even known ones, are 
unknown until we set foot on them.”  
  
José Saramago, The Tale of the Unknown Island, 1997. 





Title: Jurisdiction and Economic Competitiveness in a European Outermost Region: 
the case of the Autonomous Region of Madeira. 
 
Madeira, which is an Autonomous Region of Portugal and an Outermost Region of 
the EU, is currently facing problems regarding the sustainability of the Regional 
Government’s finances.  The Government of the Republic was asked to provide 
assistance in exchange for the implementation of an austerity plan. 
Madeira’s International Business Center, encompassed by the International 
Business Center and the Industrial Free Trade Zone created in the 80s,  is 
considered by the Regional Government as a powerful mechanism to increase 
economic growth, attract FDI and generate fiscal revenue in a period where the 
“contraction of the [Portuguese] economic activity is unprecedented”. 
As the power of regional authorities are limited by para-constitutional law, full 
fiscal autonomy from the mainland is non-existent, therefore cannot be used as a 
jurisdictional tool to promote development. 
What is its impact on the RAM’s budget, as the fiscal regime can be improved to 
decrease budget dependence from the Portuguese central government while 
maintaining the current supply of public goods and services by the Regional 
Government? 
Being an explanatory and argumentative thesis, it aims to come up with a policy 
proposal regarding  what can be done to improve the archipelago’s economy 
through the Center; methodologically consisting of literature review, economic 
data and reports produced by regional, national and European authorities along 
with interviews to those directly involved with the Center. 
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Glossary of terms and abbreviations 
ALRAM – Assembleia Legislativa da Região Autonóma da Madeira (Legislative 
Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Madeira) 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union 
CTR – Corporate Tax Rate 
EC – European Commission 
EU – European Union 
GVA – Gross Value Added 
IFTZ – Zona Franca da Madeira (Industrial Free Trade Zone) 
MAR – International Shipping Register of Madeira 
MDS – Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da Madeira (Madeira’s Development Society) 
MFPA – Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública (Ministry of Finance 
and Public Administration) 
MIBC – Madeira’s International Business Center  
OFC – Offshore Financial Center 
OMR – Outermost Region of the European Union 
PASRAM – Political-Administrative Statute of the Autonomous Region of Madeira 
RAA – Região Autónoma dos Açores (Autonomous Region of the Azores) 
RAM – Região Autónoma da Madeira (Autonomous Region of Madeira) 
RDPF – Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças (Regional Government’s 
Department of Planning and Finance) 
SIE – Small Island Economy 
SNIJ – Subnational Island Jurisdiction 








The problem and its importance 
The Autonomous Region of Madeira (RAM), a Non-Sovereign Island Jurisdiction of 
the Portuguese Republic and Outermost Region of the European Union, faces today 
one of its most difficult period in its history regarding the sustainability of the 
Regional Government’s finances.  
Due to the financial liquidity problems and unbalanced finances the Regional 
Government has asked the Government of the Portuguese Republic for assistance 
in exchange for an austerity plan to be implemented in the RAM, similar in 
solutions to the ones that Portugal has agreed to with the European Commission 
(EC), the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund on 2011. 
The backbone of the Madeiran economy, tourism and construction (Hager & Levin, 
2002), is not capable of generating enough revenue9 for the Regional Government 
and its International Business Center (MIBC) and the industrial free trade zone 
(IFTZ) has lost many companies to their international competitors as a result of 
their fiscal regime change10.  
Being a non-sovereign, or sub-national, island jurisdiction (SNIJ) the regional 
authorities’ powers are limited by para-constitutional law known as Political-
Administrative Statute of the Autonomous Region of Madeira (PASRAM) similar to 
that of Canarias Autonomous Community. This implies that full fiscal autonomy 
(capability of creating an independent fiscal system) from the mainland is non-
inexistent and cannot be used as jurisdictional tool to promote development. 
Taking the economic recession forecast by Banco de Portugal11 into account, the 
MIBC and IFTZ are considered by the Regional Government as a powerful 
mechanism to diversify small island economy, and the national economy as whole 
(Garcês, 2012), promoting qualified employment, increasing economic growth, 
attracting foreign direct investment and generating fiscal revenue (Jardim, 2012) 
in a period where the “contraction of the economic activity is unprecedented” 
(Banco de Portugal, 2012). 
Subsequently, one asks the following questions: “What is the importance of this 
special fiscal jurisdiction for the economic development of the RAM?” How do the 
MIBC and IFTZ contribute to the island economy, what is their impact on the RAM 
                                                 
9 All revenue generated in the RAM goes to the Regional Government (Pereira, Arcanjo, Afonso, & 
Santos, 2009). The construction sector is now in decline due to the fact that all major 
infrastructures are now completed and those pl anned to be constructed are stopped due to fiscal 
austerity. 
10 The current regime already predicted the change in fiscal incentives, however it was laid down 
through negotiations between the Government of the Republic and the European Commission, as it 
is considered State Aid, and can only be changed through re-negotiations. 
11
 Portuguese central bank. 
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budget, who are their direct European competitors and how the fiscal regime can 
be improved to decrease budget dependence from the Portuguese central 
government and EU funds while maintaining the current supply of public goods 
and services by the Regional Government? What do other small European 
jurisdictions - such as the British Crown Dependencies, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands12 do that the RAM could use to promote economic growth and 
public finances sustainability? Can resourcefulness of jurisdiction unlock economic 
potential and resilience? 
Methodologically, the investigation consists of a literature review from diversified 
sources regarding small island economies (SIEs), their economic development 
strategies and paradigms, statistical and economic data as well as economic 
reports produced by regional, national and European authorities, along with open 
interviews with those directly involved with MIBC and IFTZ13. 
It is important, however, to warn that this thesis is more of a case study and 
therefore a combination of explanatory and argumentative thesis rather than an 
analytical one, since I intend explain the reasons for the existence of such a fiscal 
regime and assess its economic importance as well as a policy proposal regarding 
what can be done to improve the island’s economy. 
The thesis will be divided into two parts. The first part is mainly theoretical: 
aiming to evaluate through the literature review the costs and benefits of 
“islandness” and remoteness and its impacts on the island’s economic 
development; I also plan to present the main differences between the two concepts 
of island economic development, the MIRAB and PROFIT model/paradigms and 
their ramification when the tourism sector is included. The second part will focus 
on the case of the RAM and the state aid fiscal regime14 in its present form, its 
importance to the economy, and what can be done to improve it in order to 
complement the tourism sector and boost the regional economy. 
II. Brief Historical and Economical Context 
From Political Autonomy to the present 
The Archipelago of Madeira was granted Political Autonomy, shortly after the 
Carnation Revolution, by the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal15 through 
                                                 
12 Despite the fact that some of these jurisdictions are not SIEs, they will be analyzed since they 
directly compete (Vasconcelos & Oliveira, Madeira International Business Center, 2012), in fiscal 
terms, with MIBC (Vasconcelos, Jesus, Gouveia, & Silva, 2005). 
13  Interviewees include: MDS’s President, MDS’s Director of Marketing, Fiscal lawyers and 
companies operating in MIBC/IFTZ. 
14 MIBC and IFTZ. 
15 In that time it was the Constituent Assembly. The Archipelago of Azores was also granted political 
Autonomy in the same year. 
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unanimity and acclamation in 1976, being provisional until 1990, the year it 
became definitive. 
The PASRAM turns the Archipelago of Madeira into an Autonomous Region of the 
Portuguese Republic, a territorial legal entity under public law with its own 
governmental organs: the Regional Government of Madeira16/i and the Legislative 
Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Madeira17. Political, administrative, 
financial, fiscal18 and economic autonomy is exercised in accordance and within 
the limits set forth by the PASRAM. There’s no Regional Judicial System, however 
the Ministry of Justice has transferred administrative competences to the legal 
register and notaries.  
Apart from the limitations set by the PASRAM, the RAM has the possibility to 
legislate on areas in which the regional interest arises, and that are not under the 
Sovereign Organs’ own competence19; develop, in accordance with regional 
interest, Basic Laws and adapt national legislation and general laws except if the 
power is reserved to the Sovereign Organs. 
Since the first election for the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of 
Madeira (ALRAM) in 1976, the islands have enjoyed political stability through 
absolute majorities of the Social Democratic Party of Madeira20. From this date on, 
the RAM has also enjoyed great social stability with no major strikes and or labor-
management conflicts. 
From the first days of its Political Autonomy, the RAM has seen, until very recently, 
an economic boomii, actively promoted by the Regional Government through the 
use of European funds and transfers from the Government of the Republic. These 
proceeds allowed the Regional Government to compensate for the privation of 
social and economic development in all civil parishes of the Region by equipping 
them with electricity21 and sewerage system, and equipping all municipalities22 
with health centers, secondary schools and sports venues (Nepomuceno, 2006).  
The Regional Government, along with ALRAM, created a set of policies that 
promoted the growth of tertiary sector activities (mainly tourism23 and the 
                                                 
16 The Regional Government’s Cabinet is composed of a President, a Vice-President and the 
Regional Secretaries, each of them heading a Regional Government’s Department. Regional 
Government’s Departments are then subdivided into Regional Bureaus headed by a Director 
appointed by the Secretary of the corresponding Department (please see Annex I).  
17 The ALRAM is composed by 47 members. 
18 This is limited to legally regul ated adaption of the national fiscal system, in accordance with the 
law defined by the national authorities. 
19 The ALRAM has to ask authorization of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic in order to do so.  
20 Member of the European People’s Party and the Centrist Democratic International.  
21 A total of 54. 
22 A total of 11. 
23 The tourism on the Archipelago of Madeira started early in the 19th century, when Funchal began 
to be a compulsory port of call for the Royal Navy that was on i ts way for the West Indies, and then 
when the European royal ty and aristocracy began to visit Madeira for therapeutic reasons. Royal 
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IFTZ/MIBC) and a great effort24 has been made to build divided highways to 
connect all municipalities in order to reduce distances25 as well as transport costs 
and promote internal trade, thus increasing the regional internal market size 
(Behrens & Gaigné, 2006), although without much diversification.  
The economic performance of the RAM shows a sustained growth of its GDP, 
employment and standards of living (Augusto Mateus & Associados, Sociedade de 
Consultores Lda., 2009), thanks to the timing of political options taken by the 
regional authorities in tapping into European funds and transfers from the central 
government. 
However, the Keynesian economic policies followed by the regional authorities 
have, nevertheless, led to strains26/iii in the regional public finances of the RAM 
which are complemented by central government transfers and EU funds. In 2007 
only 0.23% of the Portuguese State Budget was transferred to Regional Budget and 
in 2010 only 26.06% of the revenues of Regional Budget were transferences from 
the State Budget and EU funds (Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010). It 
is important to say that these policies were not counter cyclical. As a result, 
regional public debt has soared in the last few years.. Problems with financial 
liquidity arose in 2011 and this situation has led the Regional Government to ask 
the Government of the Republic for a loan, as previously mentioned. 
III. Economic Sustainability of the RAM: Madeira as part of 
Portugal and the European Union 
Structural Constraints to the Economic Development vs. the Benefits of 
Being an Island 
In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon27 made specific provisions for several overseas 
territories of its Member States that were known by the EU as Outermost Regions 
(OMRs), the Portuguese RAM and RAA being OMRs were covered by these 
provisions: 
“Taking account of the structural social and economic situation of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, 
Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, 
                                                                                                                                               
and aristocratic visits include: H.M. Queen Adelaide of the United Kingdom, H.I.M Empress Elizabeth 
of Austria, H.I.M. Empress Carlota of Mexico, H.I.M. Empress Amélia of Brazil, H.H. Princess Maria 
Amélia of Brazil, H.F.M. King Luís I of Portugal, H.I.M Emperor Charles I of Austria, H.I.M. Empress 
Zita of Austria, all of them marketing Madeira, by word of mouth, in their courts.  
24 Using EU funds. 
25 For example: in 1966 the travelling time (by car) between the São Vicente, in the north of the 
island of Madeira, and Funchal, the capital, was 8 hours for a distance of 32.4 km. Today the same 
distance is done in 34 minutes. 
26
 These strains are represented by an increase of dependency, in terms of budget, main ly from the central 
government. 
27The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. 
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which is compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely restrain 
their development, the Council28l, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting  the 
European Parliament, shall adopt specific  measures  aimed, in particular, at la ying down the 
conditions of application of the Treaties to those regions, including common policies. Where the 
specific measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, it shall also act on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament. 
The measures referred to in the first paragraph concern particular areas such as customs and trade 
policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw 
materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds and to  
horizontal Union programs.” 
In other words (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002): 
“The ultra-periphery is characterized by two specific features – size and isolation. The outermost 
regions do not have access to the main European centers on which they rely at political, economic and 
historical level, nor are they linked to the major world centers. (…) Their sma ll size makes them totally 
dependent on external resources, markets and services, and their absolute remoteness increases 
significantly their overall costs, condemning them to extreme isolation.”   
These specific provisions regarding the above mentioned territories are in line 
with the Development Committee of the WBG and the IMF recognition, in 1982, of 
the inherent problems that small islands and landlocked states29 face in terms of 
economic development (Srinivasan, 1986).  
Remoteness30/iv, or insularity, creates “locational disadvantages that end up being 
reflected31 in the significant additional production costs”32 that when combined 
with small economic size prevents achievement of economies of scale  (Behrens & 
Gaigné, 2006) due to “indivisibilities and limited scope for specialization”  
(Briguglio, 1995).  
SIEs are synonymous with small domestic markets, these are predisposed to “lack 
of competition in traded commodities” (Tisdell, 2009) since “small size does not 
support a large number of firms producing similar products” (Briguglio, 1995); 
                                                 
28 By Council Decision 91/315/CEE, the EU recognizes that free zones can be an appreciabl e 
instrument of economic development in the remote island regions of the Azores and Madeira.  
29 Exception is made to the French Overseas Territory of the French Guiana. However one can argue 
that the French Guiana is “landlocked” by the Amazon Forest.  
30 OMRs are cases of extreme remoteness. Notice that in 2012 only the Canary Islands have a 
regular and continuous passenger shipping links. All the other OMRs are dependent on air links. 
31 Higher transportation costs. 
32 Relatively higher per-unit transportation costs allied to reduced mobility of goods and peopl e 
(land transportation is not availabl e) and exclusion from main major sea a nd air transport routes. 
(Briguglio, 1995). Other reasons for higher productions costs include: “size of the regional territory, 
high costs of agricultural land under competition from tourism, shortage of available manpower for  
the primary and secondary sectors and the lack of capital available for productive investments (in 
light of the possible gains in the real estate or commercial sectors)” (Observatory of the European 
Islands, 2002). 
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dependence on export markets and limited ability to influence domestic prices33 
are also characteristic of SIEs. This dependence on export markets is an evidence 
of absence of a local hinterland34  (Baldacchino, Managing the hinterland beyond: 
Two ideal-type strategies of economic development for small islands territories, 
2006). Transportation costs are higher due to remoteness along with distribution 
costs (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002): 
 Due to the fact that islands are end destination markets, suppliers tend to 
dispatch only quantities that they know they are sure to sell; this creates 
pressure on prices and creates preventive purchase of goods. 
 Greater storage needs than the mainland, because of its economic 
dependence from the mainland and because of the necessity to assure that 
needs of domestic consumption in a situation of bad weather, strikes, (etc…) 
are met. 
 Small size of the companies that are responsible for the distribution of 
goods leads to the increase in the costs of production.  
Such costs35 have a similar economic effect on welfare as a tariff; this means that 
the real income of a SIE will be lower than that of an otherwise identical economy 
(Srinivasan, 1986). Extreme remoteness verified with OMRs means that 
transportation costs to these regions are higher and aggravated by the fact that 
“choices of means of transportation, or transport companies, are even [more] 
limited in these regions”36 (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002). 
The small market size of SIEs and that of its companies make it difficult to provide 
diversity and different levels of remuneration that qualified workers aspire as well 
job promotions, therefore making it difficult to attract a highly qualified and young 
workforce. Also their size makes it costly for them to internationalize their 
operations and attract a skilled labor force, while their location generates higher 
production costs as mentioned above. Taking into account all of these factors local 
companies face great competition in the local market against national or foreign 
producers that benefit from economies of scale due to the fact that they are 
operating in the mainland. 
                                                 
33 “Tend to be price-takers to a much higher degree due to the relatively small volume of trade in 
relation to the world markets in products they import and export.” (Briguglio, 1995) 
34 Situation (lack of natural resources and natural harbors) recognized by the United Nations 
Organization. 
35 These costs are also impossible to be avoided, meaning that when facing an economic transaction 
with the OMRs these costs are always present and cannot be removed (Gil, 2008).  
36 “…owing to the lack of “cheap” alternatives, and, in some of these regions, it is equivalent of 
almost one month’s salary” (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002). This is verified in the RAM,  
despite that fact that the air route has been liberalized, and the existence of low cost companied 
operating flights between Madeira and Lisbon. Maritime transportation is not subsidized. (Martins, 
Ludlow, & Ferrer, 2000) 
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Access to capital for these economies is also difficult. Because companies on an 
island are smaller than their mainland peers, they are also more prone to suffer 
from economic recessions.  
In addition, SIEs usually depend on few products37 and services38, consequently “a 
crisis in the dominating activity as a great impact on unemployment and can easily 
create a social crisis and promote strong emigration fluxes” (Observatory of the 
European Islands, 2002).  
All of these structural constraints are also reflected on “the per -capita cost of 
public services and goods” (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002) and higher 
predominance of the public sector on SIEs. 
Therefore it is easy to recognize why economic performance and sustainability of 
small islands, is highly exposed to economic forces over which they have partial 
control (Tisdell, 2009) 
Bearing in mind all of the listed above, the World Bank and the IMF recognized that 
“mechanisms and adjustments prescriptions” must take into account the 
permanent constrictions that these regions face (Srinivasan, 1986). The 
acknowledgment of such structural constraints that can never be separated, only 
mitigated or compensated, from these regions (Augusto Mateus & Associados, 
Sociedade de Consultores Lda., 2009). There is a clear sign that “normal” strategies 
and theories of development are not enough or have little relevance for SIEs as a 
way to promote a sustainable social and economic development (Prasad, 2003).  
SIEs’ capacity to be flexible, adapt strategies to their needs and come up with other 
development possibilities depends on whether they are given or have the 
possibility to become autonomous policy-making units39 (Baldacchino, Bursting 
the Bubble: The Pseudo-Development Strategies of Microstates, 1993). What can 
be available to a SIE?  
Economic development opportunities can be summed up in the following list 
(Baldacchino, Managing the hinterland beyond: Two ideal-type strategies of 
economic development for small islands territories, 2006): 
 Strategic location 
 Investment potential 
 Fishing rights 
                                                 
37 In the RAM’s case: bananas, sugar cane, flowers, wine and embroidery.  
38 In the RAM’s case: tourism, IBC-M and IFTZ. 
39 The resourcefulness of jurisdiction is powerful economic resource a SIE (Baldacchino, Islands 
enclaves: offshoring strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions, 2010) to 
overcome “fragile growth prospects of the successful sectors [in the case of the RAM, tourism and 
construction] and the virtual absence of any alternative economic activity” (Hager & Levin, 2002).  
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 Tax differentials 
 Tourism products 
However, the mentioned economic constraints should not be an excuse to SIEs to 
be fully dependent on the support of mainland40 patron, either national or 
supranational, unless they’re not given autonomous policy-making, jurisdictional 
and legislative powers. A highly developed form of self-government (or in extremis, 
sovereignty) is a key asset to rapidly adapt to changes affecting the external 
markets, allowing SIE to react in time to challenges and regain competitiveness 
(Vasconcelos, Jesus, Gouveia, & Silva, 2005). This means “using local rules to tap 
non-local resources” (Baldacchino, Islands enclaves: offshoring strategies, creative 
governance, and subnational island jurisdictions, 2010)leading to an 
“endogenously created resilience as a response to the exogenously imposed 
vulnerability” (Baldacchino & Bertram, The Beak of Finch: Insight into the 
Economic Development of Small Islands Economies, 2009).  
“Capacity to adapt laws and regulations to suit the requirements of the micro -
insular economy, even if these laws and regulations differ from those of the 
metropolis in which the smaller territory finds itself politically incorporated” is of 
great importance since it compensates the effects associated to remoteness and 
the lack of conventional economic assets. Such practices are in accordance with the 
Principle of Subsidiarity41 present in the Lisbon Treaty and verified through many 
states, either federal or unitary42.  
The existence of such mechanisms allows greater economic openness and hyper -
specialization of the economy, allowing external resources to be drawn in 
therefore sustaining a higher per capita income and foreign exchange to sustain 
the economy (Bertram & Poirine, 2007)  
Mainland patrons must question whether they want to continuously “subsidize” 
and induce these economies into perpetual economic dependence, instead of 
giving them jurisdictional mechanisms so they can develop of economic self-
resilience.  
                                                 
40 It can also be large economy neighbors. 
41 Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather,  
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. In other 
words “…Will we never heed the principle of subsidiari ty (in which our fathers were bred), namely 
that no public agency should do what a private agency can do better, and that no higher -level public 
agency should attempt to do what a lower-level  agency can do better – that to the degree the 
principle of subsidiarity is violated, first local government, the state government, and then federal 
government wax in inefficiency…” (Buckley, 2008) 
42 The United Kingdom as a unitary state, has constitutionally and statutorily given a great degree of 
self-government to its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.  
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Strategies for Island Economic Development 
Before accessing the main strategies for island economic development discussed in 
literature it is important to bear in mind that sustainability of such economic 
development cannot be done “without drawing in resources and assets from, while 
flushing out excesses and undesirables” (Baldacchino, Islands enclaves: offshoring 
strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions, 2010) to the 
outside. Although this preposition is true to any open economy, economic welfare 
in islands is even more reliant on these fluxes, so to say, than large mainland 
economies.  
Taking into account the empirical evidence from the Pacific Ocean Islands 
economies and their behavior towards the inherited constraints to economic 
development, the Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (MIRAB) model 
was developed in 1985 and 1986 considering this four variables has source of  
(in)direct income for SIEs in the Pacific rim (Baldacchino, Innovative Development 
Strategies for Non-Sovereign Islands Jurisdictions? A Global Review of Economic 
Policy and Governance Practices, 2006). In the “rent-dependent” MIRAB model we 
observe that: 
 Migration is seen as an alternative to a small labor market with few 
perspectives of big salaries, promotion and diversified job offers or in 
extreme cases to avoid poverty. In a nutshell migration is seen as a 
mechanism that improves personal and family standards of living. 
 Remittances from overseas resident migrants once settle are expected to 
flow into the SIE has a form of “strategic microeconomic family plan”, this 
form of family microeconomic planning ends up affecting the entire SIE 
since it affects the highly indebted balance of payments (John, 2010).  
 Aid requested to the international community in order to cope with major 
infrastructural projects and public sector salaries (bureaucracy). Aid 
transferences are often executed in exchange for UN votes43, cultural assets 
or military uses (McElroy & Pearce, The advantages of political affiliation: 
Dependent and independent small-island profiles, 2006). 
The MIRAB model should not, however, be considered a model of island economic 
development, since there is no notion of autonomous economic growth as it shows 
that these economies “have moved from subsistence to subsidy” (Baldacchino, 
Managing the hinterland beyond: Two ideal-type strategies of economic 
development for small islands territories, 2006). 
As a counter-response to the MIRAB the People, Resources, Overseas Engagement, 
Finance and Transportation (PROFIT) model came into existence as an alternative 
                                                 
43 This is the case of sovereign island states. 
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to two decades of MIRAB dominant academic literature. The PROFIT model does 
not substitute the MIRAB model, instead it is argued a SIE can shift from one to 
other or assume elements common to each individual model. The success of the 
PROFIT model depends on how the islanders capitalize their jurisdictional capacity 
and tools to overcome the permanent economic constraints. 
The five areas which SIE should have jurisdictional capacity in order to fully 
pursue the PROFIT model are the following (Baldacchino, Innovative Development 
Strategies for Non-Sovereign Islands Jurisdictions? A Global Review of Economic 
Policy and Governance Practices, 2006): 
 Powers over Finance: Mainly Banking, Insurance, Taxation and Gaming 
 Powers over Environmental Policy, Particularly Natural Resources 
 Powers over Access, Particularly in Relation to Air and Sea Transportation 
 Power over Free Movement of Persons 
 Powers over Tourism  
Of all these powers that are behind an effective PROFIT economic strategy, there is 
a strong reasoning for SIEs to have a differentiated tax and a more liberal, yet 
highly supervised, regulatory policies. Since the main objective of the PROFIT 
economic model is to assure the SIE economic self-resilience, the most important 
thing is to assure that government sector is not a burden to the private sector 
while it still provides a vast array of public services and goods to an isolated 
community, while depending minimally on a metropolitan patron. Self-resilience is 
dependent on tax competitiveness, since economic agents take this factor into 
account when relocating or investing in another country, such competitiveness is 
even more important to OMRs (KPMG, 2008).  
Tax policy can and should be used as an instrument of economic development. In 
reality, one of the extra-fiscal objectives of taxation is to promote economic 
development and not to hamper it (Gil, 2008). Moreover the use of the tax policy as 
the main driver of economic development is one of the most emphasized, since 
through tax policy a government can accomplish the three main objectives of 
economic policy: stabilization, redistribution and efficient allocation of resources 
(Gil, 2008).  
Consequently the use of the tax policy is extremely significant since its primordial 
aim is to support the existing bureaucracy and at the same time it should be used 
to foster economic development in two ways: reduction of production costs and 
attraction of FDI.  
Compensation of the production costs can be done in several ways. Firstly it can be 
done through corporate taxation and therefore reducing the marginal cost of 
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production per unit. This will also increase overall competitiveness of the goods 
and services produced. Another way to reduce these production costs is through 
the import duties on raw materials and capital goods, and through the taxes on 
services and goods that support production. Reduction of taxes in any of these 
areas also leads to corporate savings (Gil, 2008), this can be important for firms 
wishing to internationalize their activities but lack access to capital to do it. 
In order to attract FDI to a SIE, taxes should be lowered in the transactional 
services44 sector and in the industrial45 sector. Such a system of reduced or 
inexistent taxes is commonly known as offshores centers and free trade zones. 
Such finance centers have been successful in many SIEs and even more when 
“backed up by a large reliable patron state” 46 (Baldacchino, Managing the 
hinterland beyond: Two ideal-type strategies of economic development for small 
islands territories, 2006). This is the case47 of the UK the 1960s/1970s when it 
supported several colonies to become OFCs in order to decrease the costs that it 
had with these territories (Hampton M. , The Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the 
Global Economy, 1996). In fact such tax systems widen the tax basis, and assure 
greater fiscal revenue to the government. 
Although such fiscal benefits seem to violate the provisions of the European Single 
Market and European Competition Law it is important to remember that in the 
case of OMRs, these are territories belonging to the Single Market and without 
adaption of several European policies it would not be possible to fully incorporate 
them it (Gil, 2008). Such jurisdictional resourcefulness is needed in the economic 
field in order to cope with such constraints. EU authorities must also bear in mind 
that their goal is “to make lagging regions, including the ultra-peripheral [OMRs], 
largely self-sustaining in the long run, notably as regards large transfers from 
structural funds” (Hager & Levin, 2002), even if that might involve nontraditional 
development measures, given their special (remote and insular) conditions.  
In the end what is needed for the PROFIT model to work is a “… jurisdictional… 
capacity”, this can be achieved with “Autonomy without Sovereignty” (Baldacchino, 
Managing the hinterland beyond: Two ideal-type strategies of economic 
development for small islands territories, 2006). With Autonomy SIEs should be 
able to have responsibility and power over economic and political decisions while 
not having the burden associated with the costly mechanisms of a nation-state, 
such as defense, courts, and diplomacy. In fact jurisdictional capacity to attract FDI 
                                                 
44 As identified by Baldacchino (2010): banking and financial services, online gaming, insurance, 
shipping, ship register, trading, holdings, etc… 
45 Attraction of industrial FDI is easier if the SIE is strategically located, is member of trade area, 
such as the EU, or both. 
46 This is as happened with the Isle of Man, supported by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the Federal Territory of Labuan, supported by Malaysia.   
47 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office considers that “the peopl e of the Overseas Territories 
must exercise the greatest possible control over their own lives…”  (Cook, 1999). 
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and assets to SIEs is an effective way for remote insular regions to diversify their 
economies (Baldacchino & Bertram, The Beak of Finch: Insight into the Economic 
Development of Small Islands Economies, 2009). 
The power over free movement of persons by Non-Sovereign Island Jurisdiction 
can be a tool used to allure wealthy and qualified immigrants and if combined 
correctly with a competitive tax policy can diversify and expand the luxury tourism 
sector. Para-diplomacy if granted, or engaged informally by SIE in the economic 
and cultural areas reveals to be a powerful complement to the previous two 
policies.  
These models (MIRAB and PROFIT) are methods that focus on insular economic 
development via the tertiary sector (Baldacchino, Islands enclaves: offshoring 
strategies, creative governance, and subnational island jurisdictions, 2010), though 
it is important to say that there will never be fully MIRAB or PROFIT economy48/v, 
rather there will some degree to which a SIE will be more MIRAB or more PROFIT 
oriented.  
Additionally tourism can be present in both types of economies, and is seen as an 
activity that complements/supports these two economic models. Some literature 
puts forward that SIEs that are able to host tourism have the conditions to host 
offshore centers 49  since both share prerequisites to develop (Hampton & 
Christensen, Competing Industries in Islands - A New Tourism Approach, 2007): 
 Both economic activities tend to require being in the “pleasure periphery”, 
the same is to say a maximum of 4 hour flight from large countries; 
 Existing infrastructure for tourism activities can be used by offshore 
activities: airport, communications network and even buildings; 
 Political stability is another prerequisite, in fact a fundamental one, without 
this any economic activity that is dependent on the outside will not develop.  
Moreover there are SIEs, known as Small Island Tourism Economies (SITE50), 
these rely heavily on tourism since they are the world’s most tourism penetrated 
economies (Baldacchino & Bertram, The Beak of Finch: Insight into the Economic 
Development of Small Islands Economies, 2009). 
                                                 
48 Having present the information on this table and the Political -Administrative Statute of the 
Autonomous Region of Madeira we can say that the RAM is much more close to be a PROFIT 
economy with a strong tourism sector rather than a MIRAB economy. In fact the RAM only lacks in 
legislative powers/capability on para-diplomacy and financial management. 
49 Normally tourism precedes offshore financial activities (Hampton & Christensen, Competing 
Industries in Islands - A New Tourism Approach, 2007). 
50 Main features of SITE economies: affluent, citizens enjoy higher mobility, higher life expectancy, 
higher literacy, lower fertility and lower infant mortality rates (Baldacchino & Bertram, The Beak of 
Finch: Insight into the Economic Development of Small Islands Economies, 2009). 
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The case of the RAM: Economic and Jurisdictional Constraints. 
Located in the north Atlantic Ocean between 32°22.3′N 16°16.5′W and 33°7.8′N 
17°16.65′W. The archipelago includes the islands of Madeira, Porto Santo, the 
Desertas and the Savage Islands, but only the first two islands are inhabited, and 
the four together form the RAM. Funchal, the capital is located 980km away from 
the Portuguese capital, Lisbon. According to literature the RAM is considered a 
SIE51 (McElroy, Small island tourist economies across the life cycle, 2006).  
RAM’s Gross Value Added, according to Instituto Nacional de Estatística52 (INE) is 
characterized by the predominance of the tertiary vi  sector and a “steady 
contribution decrease of the primary sector since 1995” (Vasconcelos, Jesus, 
Gouveia, & Silva, 2005).  
Madeira Island and Porto Santo Island lack natural resources53 that could be used 
for economic activity54, although the non-existence of a long continental platform 
gives both islands good natural harbors. Development of a sound primary sector is 
difficult for the RAM, not because of its fertile volcanic soil and the existence of 
several micro-climates, but due to its topography. Primary sector production costs 
are even higher (Martins, Ludlow, & Ferrer, 2000) due to its topography the 
introduction of machinery “is virtually impossible”. “Almost 50% of the territory is 
above 700m of altitude, one fourth of it is above 1000m and 11% of it has steep 
grades above 16%” (Vasconcelos, Jesus, Gouveia, & Silva, 2005). Terraces are the 
main structure composing the agricultural landscape, already limited by the 
natural reserve forestvii that occupies two thirds of Madeira Island; consequently 
95% of the farms are less than half a hectare in size. These numbers lead to the fact 
that “less than 10% of the surface could be used for agriculture” (Wishlade & Yuill, 
2009).  
The banana production in the RAM, although successful in terms of exports, has 
steadily declined55, between the 2000 and 2009 period. Such numbers are 
explained by the aging in the farmers but also, that then translates into a decrease 
in the reduction of the number production sites, and by the competition from the 
banana production in the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands (Azevedo, 
2010).   
Transportation costs in the RAM are aggravated because: exclusively dedicated 
airfreights are not available; instead airfreights consist of “pallets in the back of 
                                                 
51RAM has an area of 801 km2 and a population of 267,302 inhabitants (estimated). 
52 National Statistical Institute of Portugal. 
53 Although all year round spring like weather is the islands main asset. Porto Santo lacks hydric 
resources (Vasconcelos, Jesus, Gouveia, & Silva, 2005) and is 42km2 in size   
54 In addition to the lack of natural exploitable resources, only one -third of the Madeira Island can 
be occupied with economic activities and housing, the other two-thirds belong to natural reserve,  
and therefor are untouchable (Parque Natural da Madeira, 2012). Porto Santo island agriculture is 
of the subsistence type due to its arid climate and sandy soils. 
55
 From 20880 tons to 13953 tons, respectively. 
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scheduled passenger flights to Lisbon several times a week” (Hager & Levin, 2002). 
This affects negatively any high value added manufacturer’s decision to locate its 
production in the RAM. This is due to the small scale economics that affects SIEs. 
Energetic dependence from the outside is a great problem. Unlike the RAA 
(Açoriano Oriental, 2009), the RAM is also highly dependent on oil imports to 
generate its energy, since there is no geothermal electrical production, wind power 
is mainly limited to the Porto Santo Island56 and hydroelectric power plants are 
very small, this makes the RAM a “relatively high-cost energy location” (Hager & 
Levin, 2002). Albeit this, investment by the regional authorities and Empresa de 
Electricidade da Madeira57 have made it possible for 28% of the electricity 
produced in 2011 to be from renewable sources (Caires, 2011). 
Despite remoteness, communications infrastructure well developed because 
Madeira is at the crossroadsviii of major North-South and East-West Atlantic fiber 
optic cables. However this is not enough to assure competitive prices regarding 
telecommunication services, nor enough band width due to low demand. Such 
infrastructure would become a valuable asset if jurisdiction over maritime public 
domain was available, enabling the Regional Government to demand more band 
width supply at competitive prices as a counterpart for the cables presence in the 
territory, therefore increasing supply and enhancing economic competitiveness of 
the RAM in telecommunications. 
The current jurisdictional status of the RAM rules out fishing rights, however the 
rest are available58 to be followed by the regional authorities in order to promote 
economic sustainable growth. However, the specific constraints that affect the 
RAM mean that it is not enough to have similar tax rates to those of its main 
European-linked counterparts. Tax policy would also need to compensate 
Madeira’s inherent disadvantages in order to attract a service based industry 
(Hager & Levin, 2002). 
It is important to safeguard in fact political affiliation to a metropolitan patron has 
several advantages to Non Sovereign Island Jurisdictions, such as the RAM, since 
the metropolitan patron, in this case the Portuguese Republic, act as “an insurance 
against some of the vagaries of the world market, political upheaval, invasion and 
natural disasters”. Other substantial economic advantages for SIEs of such political 
links are: “free trade, social welfare assistance, ready access to external capital 
through special tax concessions, availability of external labor market through 
migration and higher quality health and educational system” (Baldacchino, Islands 
enclaves: offshoring strategies, creative governance, and subnational island 
jurisdictions, 2010).  
                                                 
56 Due to Madeira’s limited space and topography.  
57 RAM’s electricity operator. 
58 To a certain degree, depending on whether the PASRAM allows it.  
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Diversification of the RAM’s economic structure to a combination of the SITE and 
PROFIT type of economy, similar to other SIEsix, is needed. RAM’s economy is 
tremendously short of economic development options  since its main dynamic 
sectors face prospect of stagnation, in the case of tourism, and decrease in the case 
of construction59 (Hager & Levin, 2002). The tourism sector growth is now 
dependent on returning to up-market in order to generate added value, since 
increase of the number of beds is highly  constrained.  
The majority of employment opportunities are narrowed to tourism 60 , 
construction and Government sector61 plays a major role. However the (Wishlade 
& Yuill, 2009) RAM could be also classified as a SITE economy; the tourism sector 
accounted, in 2000, for 30%  the regional GDP (Daniel & Rodrigues, 2010) 
Therefore promoting a sector/activity that attracts FDI widens the tax base 
assuring Regional Government financing without central government 
transferences or tax increase on the island (which aggravates the cost of living) 
must be welcomed and encouraged (Portuguese Permanent Representation to the 
European Union, 2009). Because the “attractiveness of an island’s environment 
and life style is not always sufficient to counterbalance the constraints of insularity” 
(Observatory of the European Islands, 2002).  
Insularity costsx total a 16,7% of the Regional GDP (Molle, 2005), although the EC 
recognizes that this estimative are very conservative because there are costs that 
are difficult to quantify (Portuguese Permanent Representation to the European 
Union, 2009).  
Economic development opportunities are therefore restricted to Funchal62, in the 
tertirary sector, and to Caniçal63, in the secondary sector (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
Due to PASRAM, the RAM has no power whatsoever over the movement of persons 
since this area is under national, rather than Regional, jurisdiction.  
Powers over tax policy are limited64 to (KPMG, 2008): 
 Creation and regulation of taxes only applied in the RAM. Definition of tax 
incidence, rate, settlement, collection, benefits, and tax payer guarantees; 
                                                 
59 All major infra-structural investments are now completed. 
60 This sector is prone to economic downturns arising in the main issuing countries of tourists flows 
and is characterized by being “relatively low-skilled and low-paid” (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
61 Due to fiscal austerity measures the Regional Government will have strong limitations in terms of 
hiring personnel (Governo Regional da Região Autónoma da Madeira, 2012).  
62 The capital already has limited capacity for expansion. 
63 Civil parish where the industrial free trade zone is located. 
64 These powers derive from the PASRAM and from the Regional Finances Law. Lawmaking of the 
Regional Finances Law is competence of the Assembly of the Republic, the national Parliament.  
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 Adaption of national taxes, due to regional specificities, in terms of tax 
incidence, tax benefits and tax payers guarantees, take into account the 
limits set out by law; 
 Reduction of national taxes regarding those over income and VAT, to a limit 
of 30%. 
Fiscal powers of the RAM are also limited by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) jurisprudence65 regarding sub-national jurisdictions and their tax 
systems. According with EU Law66, Treaty67 Article 107 (1): any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market. This article applies to a tax 
measure if such tax measure according to (European) Commission Notice 98/C 
384/03: 
 “provides in favor of certain undertakings in the Member State an exception to the application of the 
tax system. The common system applicable should thus first be determined. It must then be examined 
whether the exception to the system or differentiations within that system are justified 'by the nature 
or general scheme` of the tax system, that is to say, whether they derive directly from the basic or 
guiding principles of the tax system in the Member State concerned. If this is not the ca se, then State 
aid is involved”. 
In addition, Treaty68 Article 355 (3) states that provisions of the Treaties shall 
apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible. Taking into account EU and Portuguese Law and the CJEU has 
produced jurisprudence stating non-existent capacity of the RAM and the RAA to 
create its own tax system. Such analysis of jurisdictional capacity, carried out by 
the CJEU, is based on the following criteria (Portuguese Republic v. Commission of 
the European Communities, 2006):  
                                                 
65 Case C-88/03 (Portuguese Republic v Commission): Action for annulment – State aid –Decision 
2003/442/EC– Tax measures adopted by a regional or local authority – Reductions on the rate of 
income tax for natural and legal persons having their tax residence in the Azores – Cl assification as  
State aid – Selective nature – Justification by the nature and overall structure of the tax system – 
Obligation to state reasons – Compatibility with the common market.  And Joined Cases T-211/04 
and T-215/04 (Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom v Commission): State aid – Aid 
scheme notified by the United Kingdom regarding the Government of Gibral tar’s reform of 
corporate tax – Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the common market – 
Regional selectivity – Material selectivity. 
66 EU Member States recognize primacy of EU Law trough CJEU jurisprudence: “It follows (...) that 
the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special 
and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself 
being called into question.” (Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., 1964). 
67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
68 Idem. Derogations regarding State Aid concerning the OMRs and UK’s Overseas Territories and 
Crown Dependencies are mentioned in Treaty Article 355. 
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 Tax reform has been devised by a regional or local authority which has, 
from a constitutional point of view, a political and administrative status 
separate from that of the central government of the Member State; 
 The tax reform has been devised without the central government of the 
Member State being able to intervene directly as regards its content; 
 The financial consequences for regional or local government of introducing 
the tax reform must not be offset by aid or subsidies from other regions or 
from the central government of the Member State. 
If all these three criteria were fulfilled, the RAM (and the RAA) would be able to 
create its own tax system, however due to the PASRAM and the Portuguese 
Constitutional and national laws, these criteria are not met, therefore the 
Portuguese Autonomous Regions lack resourcefulness of jurisdiction regarding 
their financial and tax systems (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). Low tax in the case of 
outermost regions should not be considered a distortion of competition but a 
mechanism of leveling the playing field. 
IV. The importance of MIBC and IFTZ for RAM’s economic 
development. 
History and General Framework 
Given the economic and jurisdictional constraints of the RAM, the Regional 
Government asked the Government of the Republic for the creation of a special 
fiscal regime to foment economic development, and in 198069 the IFTZ was 
created70, but its full functioning only began in 198771. Since Portugal’s accession 
to the EU, the IFTZ/MIBC regime has been subject to several revisions72/xi and 
approvals from the EC73, as such regime is considered State Aid in accordance to 
EU Law and jurisprudence and is thus subject to the Regional Aid Guidelines issued 
by the EC for each EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework.  
As such the MIBC/IFTZ fiscal regime is fully integrated and regulated under EU and 
Portuguese law, such regulation means that (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da 
Madeira, 2009): 
                                                 
69 The creation of the IFTZ was prior to Portugal’s accession to the EU. The IFTZ was maintained, 
after accession, thanks to provisions on the Accession Treaty, under the preposition that the IFTZ 
was an important instrument of regional economic policy (that should be maintained and 
developed). 
70 Decree-Law n. 500/80 (20th of October), Regul atory Law n. 53/82 (23rd of August) and Decree-
Law n. 108/2008 (26th of June). 
71 Regional Regulatory Law n. 21/87/M (5th of September), Decree-Law n. 234/88 (5th of July). 
72 All of them re-negotiated with the EC. Each revision consists in a new tax benefi t/incentive 
regime. 
73 Such negotiations have produced three different regimes. 
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 There is full implementation of EU law regarding business activities  
admitted to the MIBC or the IFTZ; 
 Full application of norms arising from the Treaties signed by Portugal or by 
international organizations to which Portugal is member, especially OECD, 
FATF74, ILO and IMO75 apply to the regime. 
 All business activities within MIBC and IFTZ are subject to the same rules 
and proceedings regarding customs, tax and financial activities in terms of 
control, inspection and supervision. Consequently the regime has “onshore” 
characteristics, since terms and conditions are identical to those of the RAM 
and the Portuguese mainland; 
 Additional measures exist regarding the improvement of the rules applied 
to the IFTZ; 
 Complete access to double taxation agreements signed by Portugal, except 
with the Brazil and the USA; 
 Relationship with resident entities without fiscal benefits is allowed. 
In fact Portuguese investors can take full advantage of MIBC if they aim to 
internationalize their activities or develop activities. Investor activities’ income, 
whether the investor is foreign or national, will be taxed76 at normal rate if income 
derives from activities with residents in Portuguese territory and reduced tax rate 
will be applied if income derives from activities with non-residents (Sociedade de 
Desenvolvimento da Madeira, 2009). As for the IFTZ, residents in Portugal and 
non-residents will benefit from fiscal incentives regardless of the fact that their 
income derives, or not, from activities with residents.  
Because of the reasons mentioned (Freitas S. M., 2011) above MIBC/IFTZ fiscal 
regime cannot be considered, legally, technically and conceptually, an OFC; due to 
its characteristics it must be considered a preferential tax regime (Ferreira, 2011). 
In fact the MIBC/IFTZ has none of the OFCs characteristics (KPMG, 2008): 
 Inexistent or insignificant taxation; 
 Lack of information exchange between other countries our tax regimes; 
 Lack of transparency  concerning legal and administrative aspects; 
 Lack of economic “substance” regarding the licensed businesses.  
                                                 
74 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an “inter-governmental body whose purpose is the 
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering, the 
financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”  
75 International Maritime Organization. 
76 Corporate tax. 
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Such characteristics allowed the MIBC/IFTZ to never be listed in OECD “black list” 
(Vasconcelos & Oliveira, Madeira International Business Center, 2012). In fact 
MIBC/IFTZ regimes are in line with the Code of Conduct Regarding Corporate 
Taxation (KPMG, 2008) and financial activities 77, during Regime I and received 
positive evaluation in the Primarolo Report on the mentioned code of conduct 
(Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010). 
In addition, all inspections lead by the Regional Bureau for Tax Affairs, have not led 
to any license revoking due to improper conduct by companies (Secretaria 
Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010).  
The objectives behind such tax benefits are (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da 
Madeira, 2009): 
 Diversification and international orientation of the production structure of 
the economy; 
 Reduction of vulnerabilities, dependences and inefficiencies resulting from 
the traditional productive structure; 
 Strengthening competitiveness in external markets, in a sustainable and 
long-term oriented way, taking into account an open economy context; 
 Stimulating: professional training, job opportunities for qualified young 
adults, and return of Madeiran educated abroad78; 
 Attract FDI. 
This fiscal regime devised for the RAM consists of a package of incentives, in which 
the main element is corporate taxation with a “three-pillar-like-structure” in terms 
of the activities encompassed by it (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da Madeira, 
2009): the IFTZ, the MIBC and the MAR79. The administration and promotion of 
these incentives are done by MDS, on behalf80 of the Regional Government of 
Madeira. It is a company that is made up of public and private investors. MDS is 
responsible for infrastructure construction in the IFTZ and receiving and issuing 
                                                 
77 Financial activities included in the MIBC/IFTZ Regime I include banking activities, insurance 
companies, leasing and factoring entities and other financial activities.  
78 Despite the existence of the University of Madeira (UMa), many young people still go to the 
Portuguese mainland for higher education (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
79 Decree-Law n. 96/89 (28th of March), Order in Council n. 715/89 (23rd of August) and Decree-
Law n. 192/2003 (22nd of August). 
80 MDS has public concession of the fiscal regime for a period of 30 years. Concession was granted 
on 1987. 
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licenses for companies to operate within this fiscal regime, in articulation81 with 
the Regional Government’s Departments. 
The IFTZ is the industrial free trade zone, which includes activities that encompass 
physical movement of goods, and it is the oldest fiscal structure. The IFTZ is 
geographically limited to an area of 138 hectares located in the civil parish of 
Caniçal, in Machico city82. IFTZ’s regime allows for the import of capital goods and 
raw materials free of customs duties and low taxes83 on profits, companies may 
also benefit from a reduction of a 50% on taxable income when fulfilling two of the 
following criteria: 
 Contribution to the modernization of the economy through technical 
innovation, new products and procedures; 
 Diversification of the regional economy by introducing new activities of 
added value; 
 Fixation of qualified human resources; 
 Contribution to the improvement of the environment; 
 Creation of 15 jobs for a period of 5 years. 
These companies will also benefit from a suspension regime, under whose 
provisions import duties will be charged on the non-EU incorporated raw 
materials and components only when the final products leave the IFTZ. 
As for the MIBC encompasses the tertiary sector: international services, which 
include management and international trade activities, and until 200084 financial 
services85. 
Finally the MAR consists of an international shipping registry that enables the 
registration of commercial or leisure ships, oil platforms, commercial yachts and 
other ships enabling them to operate under Portuguese flag, consequently EU 
Member State flag and grating advantages on related services. The MAR registry 
has always been placed on The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control “white list” (Vasconcelos & Oliveira, Madeira International Business Center, 
2012). 
                                                 
81 MDS also operates as a bureaucracy intermediary between potential operators and the Regional 
Government’s Departments, therefore reducing investors’ time spent dealing with red tape 
(Teixeira, 2011).  
82 Located in the eastern end of Madeira Island. 
83 Tax rates have varied with the regimes approved by the EC. 
84 In terms of licenses granted. 
85 Excluded, since Regime II, by the EC with regime revisions, these included: financial activities, 
financial intermediation and intra-group type activities. Exclusion of these activities was based on 
the EC’s views that such activities have “very limited likelihood of promoting regional development,  
but a very high risk of distorting competition…” (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009) 
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Licenses86 during the first regime (hereafter Regime I) were issued before 2000 
and granted zero corporate tax until 2011, after 2000 the “licenses will be subject 
to a new regime under which a reduced rate of corporate tax (5%) applies to 
profits up to a given employment threshold and the standard rate applies to the 
remainder” (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). Regime II applies to licenses issued after87 
2000 and a reduced tax is applied to profits (3%), the reduced rate is also subject 
to an employment threshold. Finally the current Regime III is applied to companies 
licensed to operate between 2007 and 2013, however the benefits from the regime 
continue to 2020. 
Note that companies wishing to change from Regime I to Regime III will be fully 
scrutinized by the Fiscal Administration in order to assure that they fully comply 
with the new tax benefits rules (Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010).  
“Portuguese Pure Holding companies (SGPS) qualify for the full participation exemption on E.U. 
sourced dividends, provided they comply with the requirements set by the E.U. Directive EC/90/435 
and by Article 46º of the Portuguese Tax code, namely a minimum holding period of one year. Capital 
gains are not included in the taxable income of the SGPS, provided that the shares are held for a 
minimum period of 1 year (or 3 years in certain circumstances) and represent a minimum 
shareholding of 10%. Non–EU sourced dividends will be subject to 3% to 5% taxation.” (Sociedade de 
Desenvolvimento da Madeira, 2009) 
Due to negotiations and conditions imposed by the EC, tax benefits associated to 
Regime III must also comply with either create one to five jobs in the first six 
months of operation and investment of at least €75.000 in the first two of 
operations, or create at least six jobs in the first six months of operation. 
Impact on the RAM’s Economy: 
The MIBC/IFTZ is of utmost importance to the regional economy (Portuguese 
Permanent Representation to the European Union, 2009), thanks to regimes 
implemented, the RAM was able to attract “four of the 100 largest exporting 
companied and the 1000 largest Portuguese companies by volume of operations” 
all of them multinational in nature and according to 2007 data worth €500 million 
in taxable profits88 (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009).  
Another important contribution to regional economy was the creation of highly 
skilled jobs, reaching in the 2002-2007 period to 3000 direct jobs (Wishlade & 
Yuill, 2009), 40% of the jobs employ people with bachelor degree or higher 
(Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010). The regime, specially the MIBC, 
                                                 
86 Licenses are granted from the 1st of January of the first year until the 31st of December of the last 
year of the licensing period. 
87 Licensing period was from 2003 to 2006, since between 2000 and 2002 MIBC/IFTZ was 
suspended due to negotiations between EC and Portugal. 
88 These go directly to the Regional Government of Madeira. 
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has turned out to be an opportunity generator for professional and internationally-
oriented careers on Madeira, apart from public sector89.  
As well as job opportunities generated for Madeirans, the MIBC has attracted 
second-generation migrants90 from South Africa and Venezuela (Sociedade de 
Desenvolvimento da Madeira, 2010). In a nutshell, by creating job opportunities, 
the MIBC/IFTZ provides “dynamic contributors to the social and economic life of 
the island”, although contributions to these numbers from the IFTZ are very 
modest91 (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
The underestimated number of indirect jobs created by support activities to the 
MIBC companies, especially in the IT field, logistics services92, law, software 
development, procurement, international promotion, and other firms (Portuguese 
Permanent Representation to the European Union, 2009) must be added to these 
numbers. The creation of indirect jobs by the MIBC’s Regime I is bigger than in the 
other regimes, due to the fact that the first regime did not require compulsory job 
creation, hence companies subcontracted labor (Secretaria Regional do Plano e 
Finanças, 2010) through outsourcing in the regional labor market. Such 
outsourcing also reflects today’s global tendency in international enterprises.  
The tourism sector also benefits from the existence of the MIBC/IFTZ, leading to a 
potential reinforcement of high-end tourism due to the fact that two-thirds of the 
clients and owners of MIBC/IFTZ companies “visit the island at least once year and 
nearly one-fifth” visit it three times a year (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). Data also 
shows that 70% stays in five-star hotels for 3 or 4 nights. 
Diversification of the regional economy has improved since the implementation of 
the MIBC/IFTZ regime giving allowing to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, 
metallurgy, energy, maritime transportations, aircraft management, e-commerce, 
telecommunications, and other companies to emerge in the regional market 
(Portuguese Permanent Representation to the European Union, 2009).  
Such economic diversification has led to 21% contribution93 of the MIBC/IFTZ to 
the regional GDP in 2002 and that is estimated to have remained unchanged 
                                                 
89 Nowadays job qualified job creation potential is even more important, since the Regional 
Government is not able to hire, except for very few reasons, as a condition of the austerity plan to 
be implemented. 
90 70% of the employees of MIBC/IFTZ are Madeirans or second -generation migrants (Secretaria 
Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010). 
91
 Please see Annex XIV. 
92 FedEx and DHL only operate in Madeira thanks to the companies licensed in the MIBC and IFTZ 
(Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
93 “Taking into account the regulations set out by the European System of National and Regional 
Accounts (ESA 95) and the System of National Accounts of the United Nations (1993 SNA), the 
International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Manual (5th edition) and EC’s Decision 
91/450/CEE, Euratom defining the territory of each Member State for harmonization purposes in 
order to determine GDP at market prices following Directive 89/130/CEE; it is possible to conclude 
that all companies located in MIBC/IFTZ, that are active and report to INE information about their 
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(Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010). In terms of GVA, despite the lack 
of more recent data, financial activities licensed in MIBC contributed to RAM’s GVA 
70%, 48% and 49% for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively; while the 
non-financial activities contributed to 23%, 22% and 27%, the same years (MCRIT, 
2002). 
However the impact in the RAM’s economy has decreased, meaning that it is now 
negative due to Regime III. The new regime is prone to attract speculative 
developments with a very limited contribution to the regional economy, especially 
in terms of job creation opportunities (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). Adding to Regime 
III, the fiscal instability regarding VAT rates94, 2011 National Budget Law95, 
suspensions of negotiations with the EC regarding a new Regime for the 
MIBC/IFTZ and late re-opening of those negotiations led to relocation of licensed 
companies to RAM’s competitors (Dias, 2010).  
Importance to the Regional Government’s Finances 
The main criticism of the MIBC/IFTZ regime is the foregone revenuexii that 
Regional Government loses every year due to the low taxes. Foregone revenue is 
calculated presupposing that that firms that benefit from the Regimes would 
otherwise have paid tax at full rate. Such concept does not make sense because, if 
these companies paid such rates, “the reduced rate would have been a windfall 
gain and would not have altered the location decision” (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009). 
This is not the case, since if normal tax rate was applied companies would have not 
relocated to the RAM. Despite this void concept, these “doubtful calculations” 
(Wishlade & Yuill, 2009) are used by the EC to decide the proportionality of the 
Regimes as State Aid.  
In fact such argument is a fallacy, in terms of EU Competition Law (Costa, 2012), 
territorial discontinuity from the mainland96 and permanent handicaps to the SIEs 
makes it impossible to fully implement EU Competition Law as a way to provide 
sustainable economic development and with it stable fiscal revenue. Consequently 
what should be presented as an argument to the EC is the reduction of budgetary 
dependency of RAM towards Central Government and EU funds. However the fact 
that Portugal supports diplomatically other EU Member-states that defend fiscal 
                                                                                                                                               
activities in the Region must be considered on RAM’s businesses statistics, as well as in the national 
and regional accounts.” (MCRIT, 2002) 
94 Due to austerity measures in the Portuguese mainland and more recently in the RAM. The RAM 
sets its own VAT rate however it will reach 22% in April, when in 2008 had the lowest VAT rate in 
the EU (KPMG, 2008). 
95 Law 64 B/2011 ends exemption of withholding taxes regarding interests on shareholders loans 
and dividends, a benefit that was granted by the EC until the 31st of December of 2020,  that will 
now be taxed at a normal rate of 25% (unless Double Taxation Agreement applies) to non-residents.  
This “change of games rules” led to an increase in number of relocations and is perceived as fiscal 
instability, although not provoked by Regional authorities.  
96 The RAM virtual distance to the Europe’s center (represented symbolically by Maastricht) is the 
equivalent of the Madeira Archipel ago being located in the Amazonas State of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil (Observatory of the European Islands, 2002).  
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harmonization makes it difficult, diplomatically, to defend a differentiated regime 
with the EC. None the less, outermost region status and provisions should prevail 
over fiscal harmonization, given the economic constrictions affecting the RAM. 
The MIBC/IFTZ has contributed to an average of 21,9% of the total VAT revenue 
collected in RAM in the 2005-2010 periodxiii. Assuming that economic activity 
indicators remain constant, an average fivefold increase of VAT revenues for the 
same period would be enough to suppress national budgetary dependence of the 
RAM. In terms of companies licensed in the MIBC/IFTZ this fivefold increase of the 
VAT revenue would be roughly equivalent to a total of 14316 companies97, with an 
average of one employeexiv per company98. This would only be possible; at least, if 
the MIBC/IFTZ regime maintained a VAT rate of 15% and a corporate tax rate 
between 3% and 4% for an undetermined period of time.  
The coverage rate of the corporate tax rate in relation to the national budget 
transferences is irrelevant, especially when compared with coverage of the VAT 
rate in relation to the same set of transferences. Thus attractiveness of the 
MIBC/IFTZ regime should depend on a low corporate tax rate, since it does not 
compromise the regional tax revenuesxv. 
Maintenance of the Status Quo or Fiscal Sovereignty? 
Due to EU Law it is not possible for a State Aid Regime, with the conditions of the 
MIBC/IFTZ, to be permanent or implemented for an undetermined period of time.  
Periodic negotiations of the MIBC/IFTZ regime along with indexation of the 
regional taxes to the national taxes, which constantly vary every year, creates a 
high level of uncertainty to foreign investors. These negotiations of benefits with 
the EC do not reflect the regional authorities positions (Costa, 2012) regarding the 
MIBC/IFTZ because of the EC inflexibility regarding implementation of EU 
Competition Law, since such law does not take into account SIEs permanent 
development constraints.  
The current employment threshold system of benefits also drives away possible 
investors and promotes the fragmentation of several companies (Dias, 2010) in 
order for them to continue benefiting from the regime while inducing regional 
authorities to wrong statistical figures about the MIBC/IFTZ. 
Having these three points been explained, maintenance of the status quo is 
counterproductive (Costa, 2012) since “relocation of a significant number of firms 
with substantial operations” (Wishlade & Yuill, 2009) has occurred since the 
beginning of 2011 (Machado, 2012). 
                                                 
97 Assuming that average number of companies in the period of 2005 -2010 is 2863 and the average 
number of employees in the same period is 3437. 
98 This does not include indirect employment figures. 
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Another option regarding competitiveness of the MIBC/IFTZ discussed by the 
regional and national authorities is related to a reduction of the job-related 
thresholds to the tax benefits; however such measure would be incoherent in 
terms of the precedent affecting the Canary Special Zone99. 
Despite these alternatives for the MIBC/IFTZ future regime, such measures are still 
not enough to turn the MIBC/IFTZ into a complementary sustainable source of tax 
revenue for the Regional Government of Madeira.  
This simple calculus sets the debate to whether or not the RAM would be better off 
if it had the jurisdictional capacity, i.e. fiscal sovereignty, respecting CJEU and EU 
Law. Taking into account such possibility of fiscal sovereignty such would mainly 
imply: 
 Tax rates and regime are set independently from the national government. 
 
 Flexibility of adapting tax rates according to economic cycles. 
 
 No more uncertainty regarding negotiations processes with the EC, since it 
would no longer be required. 
 
 Different market regulation, and more in-line with an investment friendly 
economic setting, yet still in line with EU, Portuguese regulations and OECD 
good practices in order to avoid political counter-measures to the new 
regime. 
 
 Possibility to create new sources of revenue, apart from the services sectors, 
namely gambling. 
 
 End of national budgetary dependency and transferences from the national 
government, in accordance with CJEU jurisprudence. 
 
 Because the RAM would not cease to be an European Union territory, such 
fiscal sovereignty would be in line with EU law requisites, as well OECD 
requisites regarding tax systems, making it attractive to foreigner investors 
who now seek, due to pressures from political players and tax-payers 
(Hampton & Christensen, Small Island Economies: Exploring Alternative 
Development Strategies to Hosting Offshore Finance, 2010), transparent 
and well regulated investment friendly tax systems (Costa, 2012). 
                                                 
99 Similar to the MIBC/IFTZ regime. 
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Simple linear calculations were made using tax data100/xvi made available by the 
Regional Bureau for Tax Affairs and the Regional Bureau of Budget and Accounting 
of the RDPF, assuming the following hypothesis: 
 Tax bases (VAT and CTR)  from MIBC/IFTZ regimes and “normal regime” 
are added up forming a single VAT and CTR tax base; 
 
 Tax proportion (VAT divided by CTR) was calculated for the given period in 
order to assess the size of one tax in relation to another; 
 
 VAT rates remained unchanged due to the nature of the tax itself and 
difficulty of assessment regarding the respective tax base; 
 
 It was assumed that fiscal sovereignty would implement a tax system 
similar to the MIBC/IFTZ to all taxable entities in the RAM; 
 
 Based on the previous assumptions CTR revenue was calculated assuming 4% 
and 5%; VAT revenue was then calculated multiplying the respective tax 
proportion (of each respective year) by the new CTR revenues. 
 
 4% and 5% CRT to all economic activities were considered because these 
are the more competitive when comparing the MIBC/IFTZ regime to its 
main European competitorsxvii. 
Considering these hypothesis, foregone revenue101 due to non-existence of fiscal 
sovereignty was obtained. If a 5% CTR would have been applied to the 2005-2010 
period, revenues arising from this tax along with those from the VAT would 
generate a regional budget surplus for each year in the period considered. The 
same calculations show that for a 4% CTR, CTR and VAT revenues would generate 
regional budget surpluses only for the years 2006, 2008 and 2010; still the 
regional budget accumulated balance for the period 2005-2010 would be around 
€M 12 deficit. 
Such calculations are under-estimated since if such regime was applied to the RAM 
as whole, companies would probably102 have relocated from RAM’s competitors to 
the island. Also, these calculations do not include the revenues from other taxes 
such as customs and excise taxes103, gambling taxes and personal income taxes; 
nor the possibility of a more relaxed, yet in accordance with EU guidelines, 
regulatory environment. Multipliers effects, in terms of impact in the regional 
                                                 
100 2005-2010 period. 
101 Similar concept to that applied by the EC, but not a fallacy since a lower tax rate would in fact 
attract more taxable entities to the RAM, and those already there would not leave.  
102 This would most likely be true regarding the financial sector companies, which now pay 10% of 
corporate tax rate in several jurisdictions. 
103 Tobacco, alcohol, etc… 
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government’s finances and in the Madeiran economy, arising from the fiscal 
sovereignty are not taken into account since those are highly complex to be 
calculated. However, experience can be drawn from other jurisdictions such as the 
British Crown Dependencies104, and one can find many academic papers on the 
issue. Academic research also shows how problems, such as legislature capture 
and financial sector overpowering the tourism sector (Hampton & Christensen, 
Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re-configuration of 
Global Finance, 2002) can shed a light on how these problems can be avoided by 
other jurisdictions. One of the cases with most success in implementing an 
investment friendly tax regime is the Isle of Man. The success of the Isle of Man is 
translated into twenty-one successive years of continuous growth105 across all 
sectors accompanied by low unemployment rates (Carse, 2005) and stable 
population growth, since there are few incentives to emigrate. 
Fiscal sovereignty, taking into account these figures, is much more efficient 
economically speaking and assures that the Regional Government does not need to 
depend on national government’s nor EU’s transfers to complement its budget.  
However CJEU jurisprudence (Government of Gilbraltar v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008) is not fully explicit on whether fiscal sovereignty 
would imply that the RAM would have to create a Regional Social Security fund to 
assure pensions to the elderly, as well as sustain the judicial system and the law 
enforcement without any subsidies or compensations from the national 
government. Despite this extra burden on the regional finances, such risk is ought 
to be low due to the multiplier effects regarding fiscal sovereignty. 
The new tax system arising from such fiscal sovereignty would have to be 
competitive enough, in comparison with other European low tax regimes106, and 
would have to include the financial sector activities since these are responsible for 
generating most of the tax revenue, as showed by the CTR base from Regime I.  
A different tax and regulatory system from the mainland poses no threat to the 
Portuguese economy. Examples of good “fiscal relationships” between different 
jurisdictions are the United Kingdom and its British Overseas Territories and 
Crown Dependencies; and the Kingdom of Denmark with Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. These countries have, through home ruling and similar constitutional 
arrangements, granted legislative powers (and responsibilities) for these 
territories to achieve economic and public finances sustainability. 
Complexity arising from differentiated fiscal, and possibly regulatory, system 
between the RAM and the Portuguese Republic is not an issue since different tax 
rates are already applied. Further development of such systems would be the 
                                                 
104 Isle of Man, Bailiwick of Jersey and Bailiwick of Guernsey 
105 Data concerns GDP and GNP at constant prices for the time period of 1983-2007. 
106
 See annex XVI. 
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equivalent, for economic agents, to deal with an “external” jurisdiction, as it 
happens with the examples mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
Such tax system would allow long term economic and fiscal sustainability to the 
RAM without investment from the Regional Government, Portuguese Government 
or EU institutions since such would be attainable through law making powers; 
fiscal sovereignty can only be attained by constitutional amendment by a two -
thirds majority in the Assembly of the Republic.  




The RAM has exhausted its sources of tax revenue, since the main sectors of 
economic activity are stagnated or show poor outlooks regarding their growth due 
to interdependence between them and due to economic and financial crisis in 
Portugal. 
In order to promote economic development in the RAM, one of the poorest 
Portuguese regions of Portugal, the MIBC/IFTZ was created with the support of the 
regional, national and European authorities.  
The MIBC/IFTZ soon became one of the important sectors in the regional economy, 
which suffers from permanent constraints to its economic development and 
consequently to its government’s finances. However, due to lack of resourcefulness 
of jurisdiction made the regime to always been negotiated between the national 
government and the EC.  
The MIBC/IFTZ consists in a tax benefit system highly regulated; in fact it is a 
system that has “the best of both worlds”: low tax, regulation, supervision, money 
laundry legislation, no bank secrecy and cooperation between jurisdictions. 
Exactly what the international community is seeking to implement on the real 
offshore centers, without cutting SIEs from a source of economic growth (Hager & 
Levin, 2002) and financial independence. 
Economically and in terms of fiscal revenue the MIBC/IFTZ proved to be important 
since its creation, however the economic and financial crisis makes it clear the 
RAM needs to step forward towards its jurisdictional capacity in order to cope 
with the current financial situation.  
Tax data shows that there is possibility of the RAM to fully finance its own regional 
authorities without depending on the national or European authorities (external 
help) (Freitas G. , 2012), therefore alleviating financially these authorities. 
Therefore it is not understandable why negotiations have been dropped by the 
XVII and XVIII Portuguese Constitutional Governments.  
This step forward towards jurisdictional capacity, in the form of fiscal sovereignty, 
must be carefully evaluated, namely when implementing such system in order to 
assure that it is competitive enough to produce the desired effects in the island’s 
economy.  
Evidence shows that a 4% or 5% CTR towards all taxable entities would be 
competitive because it would attract financial services, which pay in other 
jurisdictions a 10% CTR, while providing a full EU regulatory and transparency 
environment. 
All in all it is not understandable, economically and financially speaking, why fiscal 
jurisdictional capacity has not been developed sooner. Therefore central 
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authorities must deliver such jurisdictional capacity when it would clearly alleviate 
them financially and at the same time provide mechanisms to the Autonomous 
Region to quickly and without “external” help pay its debt, achieve long term 
financial and economic sustainability. 
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ii Source: Direcção Regional de Estatística da Madeira, Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças.  
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GDP at current market prices at NUTS 2 (Euros per inhabitant) 
Portugal Continente Norte Algarve Center Lisboa Alentejo RAA RAM
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iii Source: Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças. Note: Direct debt concerns to debt contracted by the Regional Government. Indirect debt concerns only to 







2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Budgetary Dependence 16,43%17,83%14,58%13,85%13,42%13,46%14,99%17,52%19,03%
Budgetary Dependence from
Central Government
9,17% 10,65%10,06%10,18% 9,57% 11,80%11,75%14,44%15,48%
Budgetary Dependence from
EU
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iv
 Virtual distances of islands from the center of the EU (symbolized by Maastricht). Source: Observatory of the European Islands. (2002). Off the Coast of Europe: 
European Construction and the problem of the Islands.  Conference of the Peripheral and Maritime Regions, Islands Commission
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Enhancing Domestic Political 
Capacity 
Migration Flow Out In/Out 
Remittances High Medium/Low/Nil 
Aid High Low/Nil 
Bureaucracy High Medium/High 
Resource Management Low/Nil Medium/High 
(Para)Diplomacy Aid seeking High 
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vi Quota of Economic Activities in the RAM's GVA and Employed Population by Sector.  







2,4 2,2 2,4 2,4 2,2 
17,7 17,3 16,6 16,2 15,8 
79,9 80,5 81,1 81,4 82,1 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Quota of Economic Activities in the RAM's 
GVA 
Quota of agriculture, hunting and forestry, f ishing and operation of fish hatcheries and fish
farms activities in GVA (Base 2000 - %) by Geographic localization (NUTS - 2002); Annual
Quota of industry, including energy and construction activities in GVA (Base 2000 - %) by
Geographic localization (NUTS - 2002); Annual
Quota of service activities in GVA (Base 2000 - %) by Geographic localization (NUTS - 2002);
Annual
Technical University of Lisbon   Miguel Silva Pinto Correia 
53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          









Portugal Mainland North Center Lisbon Alentejo Algarve RAA RAM
Agriculture 10,9% 10,9% 11,6% 20,3% 1,2% 10,9% 5,7% 11,2% 11,9%
Industry 27,7% 28,0% 36,1% 28,9% 18,9% 23,6% 17,2% 23,8% 17,0%











Employed Population by Sector 2010  
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ixDifferent types of island economies. Source: Baldacchino, G., & Bertram, G. (2009). The Break of Finch: Insight into the Economic Development of Small Islands 
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x
 Additional costs incurred by the private sector in Madeira (1998).  Source: Wishlade, F., & Yuill, D. (2009). The Reform of the Madeira Free Zone: Impact and 
Implications of Regime Change - Final report to the Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da Madeira SA.  Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Starthclyde. 
Additional Costs incurred by the private sector in Madeira 
(1998) 





Transport 7,9% 121,60 5,1% 
Business trips 0,6% 9,20 0,4% 
Stocks 4,0% 61,60 2,6% 
Human Resources 6,7% 103,10 4,3% 
Installations 0,4% 6,20 0,3% 
Financing 4,0% 61,60 2,6% 
Marketing 2,4% 36,90 1,5% 
Total 26% 400,10 16,7% 
 
xi
 Corporate tax rates under the MIBC/IFTZ regimes and jobs thresholds  
Source: Wishlade & Yuill (2009) based on Tax Benefits Statutes Law. 
              Tax Year 
 
Date of License 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2013-
2020 
From 1987 to 2000 
Regime I 
0 0 0 0 0 n.a n.a 
From 2003 to 2006 
Regime II 
3 3 3 3 3 n.a n.a 
From 2007 to 2013 
Regime III 
3 3 3 4 4 4 5 
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Source: Wishlade & Yuill (2009) based on Tax Benefits Statutes Law 
Profit taxed at reduced rate (€ million) 
Number of Jobs Regime II Regime III 
1 to 2 1,5 2 
3 to 5 2 2,6 
6 to 30 12 16 
31 to 50 20 26 
51 to 100 30 40 
More than 100 125 150 
 
xii
 Foregone revenue computed by the RDPF. “Based on several prepositions: number licensed companies grows every year (according to rate already mentioned to the EC); 
normal corporate tax rate does not change (stays at 20%), therefore effective tax rates do not change; revenues from Regime I are based on an average effective revenue of 
€125698; new Regimes have an effective average revenue of €62240” (Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, 2010) 
Ano Total Foregone Revenue (Corporate Tax Rate) 
2009 415.173.320 € 
2010 368.783.921 € 
2011 328.934.180 € 
2012 202.373.491 € 
2013 174.822.216 € 
2014 168.835.248 € 
2015 161.454.929 € 
2016 154.378.984 € 
2017 147.607.413 € 
2018 141.064.122 € 
2019 134.825.204 € 
2020 128.814.566 € 
TOTAL 2.527.067.594 € 
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xiii
 Source: Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, Direcção Regional dos Assuntos Fiscais. 
Year Period Nº of Entities (Total RAM) Nº of Entities (MIBC/IFZ)  VAT MIBC/IFZ (tax)   VAT Total RAM (tax)   Normal VAT rate  
CINM/IFTZ VAT 
in %  
of Total VAT 
2005 19449 2815             43.110.384,06 €  248.368.322,49 € 15% 17,4% 
2006 19817 2830             73.118.987,77 €  246.777.022,33 € 15% 29,6% 
2007 19758 2840             68.259.540,28 €  243.951.636,50 € 15% 28,0% 
2008 19614 2864             54.291.319,53 €  242.049.979,01 € 14% 22,4% 
2009 19090 2906             37.448.997,60 €  222.014.818,50 € 14% 16,9% 
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xv
 Source: Secretaria Regional do Plano e Finanças, Direcção Regional dos Assuntos Fiscais. 
Year 
Period 








2005 111.700.000,00 € 295.829,38 € 0,3% 
2006 99.200.000,00 € 748.775,57 € 0,8% 
2007 162.000.000,00 € 575.512,65 € 0,4% 
2008 162.900.000,00 € 487.686,99 € 0,3% 
2009 167.000.000,00 € 1.382.763,17 € 0,8% 
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xvi












Nº of Entities in RAM
(excluding MIBC/IFTZ)
Nº of Entities (MIBC/IFZ)
 Collected VAT 
MIBC/IFZ 
 Collected VAT in RAM
(excluding MIBC/IFTZ) 
Normal VAT rate
CINM/IFTZ VAT in % 
of Total VAT
 Total VAT Collected 
2005 19449 2815 43.110.384,06 €       248.368.322,49 € 15% 17,4% 291.478.706,55 €    
2006 19817 2830 73.118.987,77 €       246.777.022,33 € 15% 29,6% 319.896.010,10 €    
2007 19758 2840 68.259.540,28 €       243.951.636,50 € 15% 28,0% 312.211.176,78 €    
2008 19614 2864 54.291.319,53 €       242.049.979,01 € 14% 22,4% 296.341.298,54 €    
2009 19090 2906 37.448.997,60 €       222.014.818,50 € 14% 16,9% 259.463.816,10 €    
2010 18491 2924 38.475.907,71 €       221.274.333,62 € 15% 17,4% 259.750.241,33 €    
21,9% Average


































2005 9693 2693 403.582.755,16 € 4.746.979.344,98 € 14.791.468,94 € 5.165.353.569,08 € 73.431.380,44 € 0 € 295.829,38 € 73.727.209,82 €
2006 9763 2753 281.497.056,02 € 6.797.061.459,68 € 37.438.778,42 € 7.115.997.294,12 € 85.575.754,60 € 0 € 748.775,57 € 86.324.530,17 €
2007 10241 2738 322.289.123,32 € 5.152.871.688,59 € 19.183.755,15 € 5.494.344.567,06 € 77.826.548,00 € 0 € 575.512,65 € 78.402.060,65 €
2008 10202 2681 333.648.727,47 € 6.239.952.742,84 € 16.256.232,94 € 6.589.857.703,25 € 70.877.785,80 € 0 € 487.686,99 € 71.365.472,79 €
2009 10240 2652 330.062.325,78 € 3.845.123.228,48 € 46.092.105,58 € 4.221.277.659,84 € 58.932.184,55 € 0 € 1.382.763,17 € 60.314.947,72 €
2010 9986 2600 280.018.180,97 € 6.868.230.747,40 € 302.042.010,67 € 7.450.290.939,04 € 61.102.818,60 € 0 € 11.827.639,72 € 72.930.458,32 €
Corporate Tax Rate Data
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2005 5.165.353.569,08 € 206.614.142,76 € 258.267.678,45 € 816.843.920,12 € 1.021.054.900,14 € 1.096.801.500,00 € 182.521.078,60 € -73.343.437,12 €
2006 7.115.997.294,12 € 284.639.891,76 € 355.799.864,71 € 1.054.800.593,91 € 1.318.500.742,39 € 1.166.251.900,00 € 508.048.707,10 € 173.188.585,68 €
2007 5.494.344.567,06 € 219.773.782,68 € 274.717.228,35 € 875.178.926,98 € 1.093.973.658,73 € 1.248.565.400,00 € 120.125.487,08 € -153.612.690,34 €
2008 6.589.857.703,25 € 263.594.308,13 € 329.492.885,16 € 1.094.561.228,38 € 1.368.201.535,48 € 1.317.101.500,00 € 380.592.920,64 € 41.054.036,51 €
2009 4.221.277.659,84 € 168.851.106,39 € 211.063.882,99 € 726.366.416,21 € 907.958.020,27 € 1.059.285.500,00 € 59.736.403,26 € -164.067.977,39 €
2010 7.450.290.939,04 € 298.011.637,56 € 372.514.546,95 € 1.061.402.828,93 € 1.326.753.536,16 € 1.194.768.500,00 € 504.499.583,11 € 164.645.966,49 €
TOTAL 1.755.524.179,78 € -12.135.516,18 €
Foregone Fiscal Revenue due to inexistence of Fiscal Soverengty
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xvii
 Source: MDS, February 2012. 
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